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Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations
The stationary equation:
−H(x ,Dv(x)) = 0, x ∈ X ⊂ Rd + a boundary condition,
H(x , p) = min
a∈A(x)
max
b∈B(x)
[f (x , a, b) · p + g(x , a, b)], x ∈ X , and p ∈ Rd ,
is the dynamic programming equation satisfied by the (upper) value
function of the zero-sum game problem:
v(x) = inf
(αt )t≥0
sup
(βt )t≥0
∫ ∞
0
g(xt , αt , βt)dt ,
where x˙t = f (xt , αt , βt), for all t ≥ 0, and inf and sup are taken over
nonanticipating strategies of the first and second player (where the
second player knows the current action of the first player).
Example: pursuit evasion games.
Discretization with a monotone scheme (for instance a Kushner
scheme)
⇒
v = F (v), the fixed point equation of the dynamic programming or
Shapley operator F of a discrete time zero-sum two player stochastic
game problem with finite state space.
Same for: Discounted problems, Optimal stopping time problems,
Stochastic games.
Discrete time and state zero-sum stochastic games
Let F : Rn → Rn be defined by:
[F (v)]i := min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi

∑
j∈[n]
Mabij vj + r
ab
i

 , i ∈ [n],
with Mabij ≥ 0 for all i , j ∈ [n], a ∈ Ai , b ∈ Bi .
The map F is the dynamic programming or Shapley operator of a dis-
crete time zero-sum two player game problem with perfect information
on the finite state space X := [n] := {1, . . . , n}, with:
Ai ,Bi sets of actions of the 1st, 2nd player MIN, MAX, when in state i
rabi reward paid by MIN to MAX, at each time
Mabij := γ
ab
i P
ab
ij ≥ 0
γabi :=
∑
j∈[n]M
ab
ij ≥ 0 discount factor (< 1 or ≤ 1 or = 1)
Pabij transition probability from i to j (
∑
j∈[n] P
ab
ij = 1).
Discrete time and state zero-sum stochastic games
Let F : Rn → Rn be defined by:
[F (v)]i := min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi

∑
j∈[n]
Mabij vj + r
ab
i

 , i ∈ [n],
with Mabij ≥ 0 for all i , j ∈ [n], a ∈ Ai , b ∈ Bi .
Denote γabi :=
∑
j∈[n]M
ab
ij .
Then
• F is order preserving: u ≤ v ⇒ F (u) ≤ F (v), for all u, v ∈ Rn;
• if γabi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n] and a ∈ A, b ∈ B, then F is additively
sub-homogeneous: F (λ+ u) ≤ λ+ F (u), for all λ ≥ 0 and u ∈ Rn
• thus F is sup-norm nonexpansive.
• If γabi = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and a ∈ A, b ∈ B, then F is additively
homogeneous: F (λ+ u) = λ+ F (u), for all λ ∈ R and u ∈ Rn.
Let the value function of the game with infinite horizon be given by:
vx = inf
(αk )k≥0
sup
(βk )k≥0
E
[
∞∑
k=0
(
k−1∏
ℓ=0
γαℓ,βℓXℓ )r
αk ,βk
xk | X0 = x
]
,
where αk and βk are possible strategies of both players of the game (at
time k ), and Xk ∈ [n] is the state process of the game satisfying
P(Xk+1 = j |Xk = i , αk = a, βk = b) = P
ab
ij .
If γa,bx ≤ γ¯ < 1, then F is a sup-norm contraction:
‖F (v)− F (w)‖∞ ≤ γ¯‖v − w‖∞ ,
and v is the unique solution of
v = F (v).
Moreover the optimal actions in F (v) give the optimal stationary
strategies of the game.
Solving stationary dynamic programming equations
Problem: compute v ∈ Rn such that F (v) = v , when such a solution is
unique, and bound the complexity of this computation.
When γabi ≤ γ¯ < 1 for all i ∈ [n] and a ∈ A, b ∈ B, then
• Then, the value iterations coincide with fixed point iterations:
vk+1 = F (vk ), and with the finite horizon approximations with
T = k and ϕ = v0. They converge geometrically towards v with
factor γ¯:
lim
k→∞
‖vk − v‖1/k ≤ γ¯ .
• However, the value iteration algorithm is only pseudopolynomial.
• Also the existence of a polynomial algorithm is an open problem.
• What about the policy iteration?
Policy iterations for discounted games
Assume: Ai and Bi are finite sets, and
Denote by Σ := {σ : i ∈ [n] 7→ σi ∈ Ai} and ∆ := {δ : i ∈ [n] 7→ δi ∈ Bi}
the sets of policies,
and for σ ∈ Σ and δ ∈ ∆, define the matrices and vectors:
M(σδ) = (Mσiδiij )ij=1,...,n, and r
(σδ) = (rσiδii )i=1,...,n ,
and the affine maps
F (σδ)(v) = M(σδ)v + r (σδ), v ∈ Rn .
Then, F can be written as:
F (v) = min
σ∈Σ
F (σ)(v) , with F (σ)(v) := max
δ∈∆
F (σδ)(v) , v ∈ Rn ,
where minima and maxima are for the partial order of Rn.
The maps F (σδ), F (σ) and F are all order preserving and contracting for
the sup-norm with contraction factor γ¯.
Important: the infimum and supremum are attained because the sets
{F (σ)(v) | σ ∈ Σ} and {F (σδ)(v) | δ ∈ ∆} are rectangular.
Policy iterations for discounted games
(Howard, 1960) for 1-player games, (Denardo, 1967) for 2-player
games.
Using operators:
Given an initial policy σ0 ∈ Σ, apply successively the two following steps
for s ≥ 0 until σs+1 = σs:
1 Compute the fixed point vs of F (σ
s);
2 Improve the policy: choose an optimal policy for vs, that is
σs+1 ∈ Σ such that F (vs) = F (σ
s+1)(vs)
with σs+1 = σs as soon as this is possible.
Step 1 is solved by using Policy iteration for the (one-player) game with
fixed policy σs, which constructs vs,l and δs,l from δs,0.
Policy iterations for discounted games
(Howard, 1960) for 1-player games, (Denardo, 1967) for 2-player
games.
With control terminology:
Given an initial policy σ0 ∈ Σ, apply successively the two following steps
for s ≥ 0 until σs+1 = σs:
1 Compute the value vs of the game with fixed policy σs, that is the
solution of v = F (σ
s)(v);
2 Improve the policy: choose an optimal policy for vs, that is
σs+1 ∈ Σ such that F (vs) = F (σ
s+1)(vs) or equivalently:
σs+1i ∈ argmin
a∈Ai

maxb∈Bi

∑
j∈[n]
Mabij v
s
j + r
ab
i



 , i ∈ [n],
with σs+1 = σs as soon as this is possible.
Policy iterations for discounted games
(Howard, 1960) for 1-player games, (Denardo, 1967) for 2-player
games.
Simplex algorithm for 1-player games with Dantzig pivoting:
Given an initial policy σ0 ∈ Σ, apply successively the two following steps
for s ≥ 0 until σs+1 = σs:
1 Compute the value vs of the game with fixed policy σs, that is the
solution of v = F (σ
s)(v);
2 Improve the policy: choose a policy σs+1 ∈ Σ such that
σs+1i ∈ argmin
a∈Ai

maxb∈Bi

∑
j∈[n]
Mabij v
s
j + r
ab
i



 , i ∈ [n],
for one i such that (F (σ
s)(vs)− F (vs))i is maximal.
Policy iterations for discounted games
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Policy iterations for discounted games: monotone
convergence
• The sequence (vs)s≥0 is nonincreasing;
• Hence, the sequence (σs)s≥0 does not visit the same policy two
times, until it becomes stationary;
• So the sequence (vs)s is stationary after a finite time (at most ♯Σ),
and converges towards the solution v of v = F (v).
Policy iterations for discounted games: monotone
convergence
• The sequence (vs)s≥0 is nonincreasing;
• Hence, the sequence (σs)s≥0 does not visit the same policy two
times, until it becomes stationary;
• So the sequence (vs)s is stationary after a finite time (at most ♯Σ),
and converges towards the solution v of v = F (v).
• When s is fixed, the sequence (vs,l)l is nondecreasing;
• Hence, the sequence (δs,l)l does not visit the same policy two
times, until it becomes stationary;
• So the sequence (vs,l)l is stationary after a finite time (at most ♯∆),
and converges towards the solution vs of v = F (σ
s)(v).
Policy iterations for discounted games: well known
properties
• The Policy iterations converge faster than the value iterations: for
all s ≥ 0, v ≤ vs+1 ≤ F (vs) ≤ vs, so v ≤ vs ≤ F s(v0) ≤ v0.
• If the discount factor is uniformely bounded by some constant
γ¯ < 1, then for the sup-norm, we have:
‖vs+1 − v‖ ≤ ‖F (vs)− v‖ ≤ γ¯‖vs − v‖ .
• For 1-player games with an infinite number of actions and under
regularity conditions, Policy iterations coincide with the Newton
algorithm, and have a super-linear convergence.
• However, in general, the number of (external) iterations is bounded
by ♯Σ ≥ 2n if ♯Ai ≥ 2 for all i ∈ [n].
Policy iterations for discounted games: recent results
• (Friedmann, 2009) showed a 2-player deterministic game problem
with γ ≃ 1 and an exponential number of iterations.
• (Fearnley, 2010) and (Andersson, 2009) showed the same for a
1-player stochastic game.
Policy iterations for discounted games: recent results
(Ye, 2011) showed that Policy iteration algorithm and Simplex algorithm
solve 1-player discounted games with fixed discount factor γ < 1 in
strongly polynomial time.
(Hansen, Miltersen and Zwick, 2011) extended and improved this result
to Policy iteration algorithm for 2-player games. They show that the
number of iterations smax (to obtain stationarity) satisfies:
smax ≤ (m + 1)(1+
log(n2/(1− γ))
− log(γ)
) = O(
m
1− γ
log
n
1− γ
),
with m = the total number of actions: the number of (i , a, b) with i ∈ [n],
a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi .
(Feinberg, Huang, 2013): Same for a one-player game with
mean-payoff, and a state i0 such that P
a
i,i0
≥ 1− γ, for all i ∈ [n], a ∈ Ai .
Question: What remains true when the discount factors γabi are not
uniformely bounded by a constant < 1?
or for games with mean-payoff?
Theorem (A., Gaubert, arXiv:1310.4953)
Let us fix 0 < λ < 1. The policy iteration algorithm for the class of
2-player games satisfying
r(M(σδ)) ≤ λ ∀σ ∈ Σ, δ ∈ ∆
is strongly polynomial. More precisely, the number of external iterations
smax satisfies:
smax ≤ (m1 − n)(1+ ⌊
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
⌋) = O(
m1 − n
1− λ
log
1
1− λ
),
with m1 = the total number of actions of the first player: the number of
(i , a) with i ∈ [n] and a ∈ Ai .
Proof. • Adapt the proof of (Hansen, Miltersen and Zwick, 2011) by
using sup-norms instead of ℓ1 norms and the nonlinear maps F
(δ)
to obtain the above bound when the discount factors are ≤ λ. A
similar bound is obtained by (Scherrer, 2013) in the one-player
case with fixed discount factor.
• Using nonlinear spectral theory, show that for all λ < µ < 1, there
exists ϕ ∈ Rn such that ϕi > 0, i ∈ [n], and M
(σδ)ϕ ≤ µϕ.
• Let G(v) = ϕ−1F (ϕv) with ϕv = (ϕivi)i∈[n]. Then G is the dynamic
programming operator of a game with discount factors ≤ µ, and the
sequence of policies σs for F and G are the same, so is smax.
• Equivalently, F is contracting on Rn with contraction factor µ, for the
weighted sup-norm ‖ · ‖ϕ defined by:
‖v‖ϕ := max
i∈[n]
|
vi
ϕi
| ∀v ∈ Rn .
• Take the infimum of the bound over all µ.
Proof. • Adapt the proof of (Hansen, Miltersen and Zwick, 2011) by
using sup-norms instead of ℓ1 norms and the nonlinear maps F
(δ)
to obtain the above bound when the discount factors are ≤ λ. A
similar bound is obtained by (Scherrer, 2013) in the one-player
case with fixed discount factor.
• Using nonlinear spectral theory, show that for all λ < µ < 1, there
exists ϕ ∈ Rn such that ϕi > 0, i ∈ [n], and M
(σδ)ϕ ≤ µϕ. ← details
• Let G(v) = ϕ−1F (ϕv) with ϕv = (ϕivi)i∈[n]. Then G is the dynamic
programming operator of a game with discount factors ≤ µ, and the
sequence of policies σs for F and G are the same, so is smax.
• Equivalently, F is contracting on Rn with contraction factor µ, for the
weighted sup-norm ‖ · ‖ϕ defined by:
‖v‖ϕ := max
i∈[n]
|
vi
ϕi
| ∀v ∈ Rn .
• Take the infimum of the bound over all µ.
Definition (Nonlinear spectral radii (Nussbaum,Mallet-Paret, 1998))
Let h be a nonlinear continuous positively homogenous map on a
closed convex cone C of Rn (h(λv) = λh(v) for all λ > 0 and v ∈ C):
• The cone eigenvalue spectral radius of h, rˆC(h), is the maximal
modulus of an eigenvalue of h in C, where λ is an eigenvalue
associated to v ∈ C\{0} if h(v) = λv .
• The Collatz-Wielandt number cwC(h) is the infimum of the
super-eigenvalues of h, where λ > 0 is a super-eigenvalue if there
exists v in the interior of C such that h(v) ≤ λv .
• The Bonsall’s spectral radius of h is defined as:
rC(h) := inf
k≥1
‖hk‖
1/k
C
, with ‖h‖C := sup
x∈C, ‖x‖=1
‖h(x)‖ ,
for any given norm ‖ · ‖ on Rn.
Theorem (Nussbaum, LAA 1986, also (A., Gaubert, Nussbaum, arXiv 2011))
For a continuous, positively homogenous, order preserving selfmap h of
C = Rn+, all the above spectral radius notions of h coincide:
r(h) = infk≥1 ‖h
k‖
1/k
R
n
+
= max{λ ∈ R | ∃v ∈ Rn+\{0}, h(v) = λv}
= inf{λ > 0 | ∃v ∈ (R∗+)
n, h(v) ≤ λv}
Proposition (A. Gaubert, Nussbaum, arXiv 2011)
Assume that h and hπ are continuous, positively homogenous, order
preserving selfmaps of Rn+, for all π ∈ Π, and that h(v) = maxπ∈Π hπ(v)
for all v ∈ Rn+, then
r(h) = max
π∈Π
r(hπ) .
Applying the proposition to h(v) := maxσ∈Σmaxδ∈∆(M
(σδ)v), we get
that r(h) ≤ λ < µ and so by the theorem, there exists ϕ ∈ (R∗+)
n such
that M(σδ)ϕ ≤ h(ϕ) ≤ µϕ, for all σ ∈ Σ, δ ∈ ∆.
Consider the value function of the game with mean-payoff:
ηx = inf
(αk )k≥0
sup
(βk )k≥0
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T−1∑
k=0
r
αk ,βk
xk | X0 = x
]
.
Let F be the dynamic programming operator such that γabi ≡ 1.
F is additively homogeneous. We say that v ∈ Rn is an (nonlinear
additive) eigenvector or biais of F with eigenvalue ρ ∈ R if F (v) = ρ+ v .
• If ρ exists, then ηx = ρ for all x ∈ [n].
• If all the matrices M(σδ) are irreducible, then ρ exists and the
eigenvector v is unique up to an additive constant.
• Other existence results of ρ: Bather, 1973, Gaubert, Gunawardena,
2001.
Policy iterations for “irreducible” mean-payoff games
(Hoffman and Karp, 1966) We have to solve ρ+ v = F (v).
Using operators:
Given an initial policy σ0 ∈ Σ, apply successively the two following steps
for s ≥ 0 until σs+1 = σs:
1 Compute the additive eigenvalue and eigenvector ρs and vs of
F (σ
s), that is the solution of ρ+ v = F (σ
s)(v);
2 Improve the policy: choose an optimal policy for vs, that is
σs+1 ∈ Σ such that F (vs) = F (σ
s+1)(vs)
with σs+1 = σs as soon as this is possible.
Step 1 is solved by using Policy iteration for the (one-player) game with
fixed policy σs, which constructs ρs,l , vs,l and δs,l from δs,0.
Policy iterations for “irreducible” mean-payoff games
(Hoffman and Karp, 1966) We have to solve ρ+ v = F (v).
With control terminology:
Given an initial policy σ0 ∈ Σ, apply successively the two following steps
for s ≥ 0 until σs+1 = σs:
1 Compute the value ρs and the biais vs of the game with fixed policy
σs, that is the solution of ρ+ v = F (σ
s)(v);
2 Improve the policy: choose an optimal policy for vs, that is
σs+1 ∈ Σ such that F (vs) = F (σ
s+1)(vs) or equivalently:
σs+1i ∈ argmin
a∈A

maxb∈B

∑
j∈[n]
Mabij v
s
j + r
ab
i



 , i ∈ [n],
with σs+1 = σs as soon as this is possible.
Policy iterations for “irreducible” mean-payoff games:
monotone convergence
• The sequence (ρs)s≥0 is nonincreasing;
• If ρs = ρs+1, then vs − vs+1 is constant and vs = v .
• Hence, the sequence (σs)s≥0 does not visit the same policy two
times, until it becomes stationary;
• So the sequence (ρs, vs)s is stationary after a finite time (at most
♯Σ), up to an additive constant, and converges towards the solution
(ρ, v) of ρ+ v = F (v).
Policy iterations for “irreducible” mean-payoff games:
monotone convergence
• The sequence (ρs)s≥0 is nonincreasing;
• If ρs = ρs+1, then vs − vs+1 is constant and vs = v .
• Hence, the sequence (σs)s≥0 does not visit the same policy two
times, until it becomes stationary;
• So the sequence (ρs, vs)s is stationary after a finite time (at most
♯Σ), up to an additive constant, and converges towards the solution
(ρ, v) of ρ+ v = F (v).
• When s is fixed, the sequence (ρs,l)l is nondecreasing;
• If ρs,l = ρs,l+1, then vs,l − vs,l+1 is constant and vs,l = vs.
• Hence, the sequence (δs,l)l does not visit the same policy two
times, until it becomes stationary;
• So the sequence (ρs,l , vs,l)l is stationary after a finite time (at most
♯∆), and converges towards the solution (ρs, vs) of
ρ+ v = F (σ
s)(v).
For a Markov matrix M and states i , j , denote:
Tij(M) = E[inf{k ≥ 1 | Xk = j} | X0 = i] ,
the expected first return (or hitting) time in state j , starting from i .
Note that Tii0(M) < +∞ for all i ∈ [n] if and only if M has a unique
recurrent (final) class and i0 belongs to it.
Theorem (A., Gaubert, arXiv:1310.4953)
Let us fix K > 0 and a state i0. The policy iteration algorithm for the
class of 2-player mean-payoff games such that
Tii0(M
(σδ)) ≤ K ∀σ ∈ Σ, δ ∈ ∆, i ∈ [n]
is strongly polynomial. More precisely, the number of external iterations
smax satisfies:
smax ≤ (m1 − n)(1+ ⌊
log(K )
log(K/(K − 1)
⌋) = O((m1 − n)K logK ),
with m1 = the total number of actions of the first player.
Sketch of the proof. • Let ϕ ∈ (R∗+)
n be defined by:
ϕi = maxσ∈Σmaxδ∈∆ Tii0(M
(σδ)).
• Let Q(σδ) be obtained from M(σδ) by putting its i0th column to zero.
Then ϕ = 1+maxσ∈Σmaxδ∈∆(Q
(σδ)ϕ).
• Let N(σδ) be obtained from M(σδ) by replacing its i0th column by the
nonnegative vector (ϕ− 1−Q(σδ)ϕ)/ϕi0 .
• N(σδ) has nonnegative entries and satisfies:
N(σδ)ϕ = ϕ− 1 ≤ λϕ with λ = 1− 1/K ⇒ r(N(σδ)) ≤ λ .
• Then the map
G(v) = min
σ∈Σ
max
δ∈∆
(N(σδ)v + r (σδ)) , v ∈ Rn
satisfies the assumptions of the theorem for discounted games.
• If vi0 = 0, then ρ+ v = F (v)⇔ ρϕ+ v = G(ρϕ+ v).
• Hence, the sequences of policies σs and δs,l for F and G are the
same.
Example: Spammer vs. Web search engine
11
10
13
12
20
21
17
16
19
18
151
3
2
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4
7
6
9
8
14
Nodes = web pages
Arcs = hyperlinks
21 : spammer page
1 : non controlled page.
Associated Markov matrix
S: Sij = 1/Ni if (i , j) is an
hyperlink, Sij = 0
otherwise; Ni = number of
hyperlinks from i .
The PageRank is the
invariant measure π of S.
• Let v be the preference probability vector of the Web search engine
• Let α be a damping factor: the probability for a Web surfer to use
the Web seach engine.
• Usually, one replaces S by αS + (1− α)✶v , ✶ = (1 · · · 1)T .
• Similar to consider the Markov matrix of the Web with the Web
search engine: M =
[
0 v
α✶ (1−α)S
]
.
• If r is an instantaneous reward such that ri = 1 for i = s and 0
otherwise, then the mean-payoff is the PageRank (frequency of
visit) πs of the spammer site s.
• Optimizing the spammer site is a 1-player game with mean-payoff
(see for instance (Fercoq, A., Bouhtou, Gaubert, IEEE TAC 2013).
A zero-sum game problem:
• σ ∈ Σ is the policy of the Web search engine, it controls v and
wants to minimize the PageRank of the spammer site;
• δ ∈ ∆ is the policy of the spammer, it controls the rows of S with
index in his site, and wants to maximize its PageRank.
• All final classes of M(σδ) contain state 1 (the Web search engine).
In the general case, we need to apply Policy iterations for multichain
mean-payoff games,...
and to find a complexity result.
Related recent results for 1-player discounted games
• (Post, Ye, 2012) show that the simplex algorithm for deterministic
MDP (1-player games) is strongly polynomial independently of the
discount factor: it stops after O(n5m2 log2 n) iterations, where m is
the number of possible actions by state (thus m1 = nm).
• (Scherrer, 2013) generalizes this result to stochastic MDP which
satisfy a bound which may be seen (and is equal when the
discount factor γ tends to 1) as a bound τr on the expected first
return time to recurrent states and a bound τt on the expected exit
time from transient states. Under these conditions the simplex
algorithm stops after O(n3m2τrτt log
2(nτrτt)).
• (Scherrer, 2013) shows a similar result for Policy Iteration algorithm
for stochastic MDP (1-player games), when the set of transient
states is independent of the strategy. Under these conditions the
Policy iteration algorithm stops after
n(m − 1)(⌈τr log(nτr )⌉+ ⌈τt log(nτt)⌉) iterations.
• However, this assumption implies that the recurrent classes are
independent of the strategy.
Theorem (A., Gaubert, 2014)
Let us fix K > 0 and a state i0. The policy iteration algorithm for the
class of 2-player discounted games with fixed discount factor,
M(σδ) = γP(σδ) with γ < 1, such that
Tii0(P
(σδ)) ≤ K ∀σ ∈ Σ, δ ∈ ∆, i ∈ [n]
is strongly polynomial. More precisely, the number of external iterations
smax satisfies:
smax ≤ (m1 − n)(1+ ⌊
log(K )
log(K/(K − 1)
⌋) = O((m1 − n)K logK ),
with m1 = the total number of actions of the first player.
Hence the bound does not depend on γ.
For a Markov matrix M, a state i and set C of states, denote:
TiC(M) = E[inf{k ≥ 1 | Xk ∈ C} | X0 = i] ,
the expected first return (or hitting) time in set C, starting from i .
Theorem (A., Gaubert, 2014)
Let us fix K > 0 and a subset C of states with cardinality s. The policy
iteration algorithm for the class of 2-player multichain mean-payoff
games such that for all σ ∈ Σ, δ ∈ ∆, each final class of M(σδ) contains
exactly one element of C and
TiC(M
(σδ)) ≤ K ∀i ∈ [n]
is strongly polynomial. More precisely, the number of external iterations
smax satisfies:
smax ≤ (m1 − n)(1+ ⌊
log(sK )
log(sK/(sK − 1)
⌋) = O((m1 − n)sK log(sK )),
with m1 = the total number of actions of the first player.
Multichain mean-payoff games
• In general, F may not have additive eigenvalue and eigenvector,
that is ρ and v such that ρ+ v = F (v).
• If the action spaces Ai and Bi are finite for all i ∈ [n], then F is
polyhedral, and since it is also nonexpansive, by the Kohlberg
(1980) theorem, there exist η and v in Rn such that
F (tη + v) = (t + 1)η + v , for t large enough.
• (η, v) is called an invariant half-line.
• Then η is the value of the game with mean-payoff.
• Moreover, there exist Fˆ and F´· such that (η, v) is an invariant
half-line if and only if it satisfies the system:{
η = Fˆ (η) ,
η + v = F´η(v) .
• However v is not unique.
Policy iterations for multichain mean-payoff games
Construct a sequence of policies σs, values ηs and biais vs.
They were introduced and proved to converge by
• (Howard, 1960) and (Denardo and Fox, 1968) for 1-player
multichain mean-payoff games,
• (Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski, 2000) for parity games,
• (Cochet-Terrasson, Gaubert, Gunawardena, 1998 and 1999),
(Bjorklund, Sandberg, Vorobyov, 2004), (Jurdzin´ski,Paterson,
Zwick, 2006) for 2-player deterministic games,
• (Cochet-Terrasson and Gaubert, 2006), (A., Cochet-Terrasson,
Detournay, and Gaubert, arXiv:1208.0446, and CDC 2013),
(Detournay,PIGAMES library, 2012), (Bourque, Raghavan, preprint,
2012) for general multichain 2-player stochastic games.
(Detournay, 2012).
To avoid cycling, one need to add some constraints on vs, for instance:
• fix the value vsi = 0 at one point i of each final class of M
(σδ)
(Howard, and Denardo and Fox, for one-player games);
• by a nonlinear projection (Cochet-Terrasson and Gaubert);
and to choose optimal policies in a conservative way.
Summary:
• The policy iteration algorithm for discounted games is strongly
polynomial when restricted to the class of games such that the
spectral radii of all M(σδ) are bounded by λ < 1. This result is
invariant by diagonal scaling.
• The policy iteration algorithm for ergodic mean-payoff games is
strongly polynomial when restricted to the class of ergodic games
such that the expected first return (or hitting) time in some fixed
state i0 of the Markov chain associated to any M
(σδ) and initial state
is bounded by K <∞.
• Same result for discounted games.
• Same result for multichain mean-payoff games, when i0 is replaced
by a set of states C, and each recurrence class contains exactly
one element of C.
Open:
• Is the policy iteration algorithm for multichain stochastic games
strongly polynomial, under some more general constraints on the
M(σδ) (only)?
